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THE BEGINNING OF THE END:
IMPLICATIONS OF VIOLATING USERRA
Jessica Vasil
I.

INTRODUCTION

“Every year, more than a thousand National Guard, reserve and active-duty troops coming back
from Iraq, Afghanistan or other military duties complain of being denied jobs or otherwise being
penalized by employers because of their military obligations. The biggest offender: the federal
government.” 1 In fiscal year 2011, “More than 18 percent of the 1,548 complaints of violations
of [the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act] involved federal
agencies, according to figures obtained under the Freedom of Information Act.” 2 These
violations are not exclusive to federal agencies; some are privately owned companies. 3
Kevin Ziober was a member of the United States Navy Reserve. 4 His full-time civilian employer
was BLB Resources, Inc., a real estate marketing and managing firm. 5 Approximately six
months after he was hired, Mr. Zoiber signed a bilateral arbitration agreement. 6 After that, Mr.
Zoiber was called to serve his country in a deployment to Afghanistan. 7 Mr. Zoiber provided
notice to his employer that he would be taking leave to serve his country; on his last day with the
company, he was told he would not have a job at BLB Resources, Inc. after he returned from his
deployment. 8
In April 2014, after returning from Afghanistan, Mr. Zoiber sued his former employer for
“violating USERRA's provisions protecting service members against discrimination and
establishing reemployment rights.” 9 The employer moved to have the arbitration agreement
enforced, and the district court obliged. 10 Mr. Zoiber appealed, claiming that the “plain text and
history of USERRA [Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act] reveal
that Congress intended to preclude the compelled arbitration of claims arising under its
provisions.” 11
The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (“USERRA”) has
three stated purposes: (1) to encourage service in the National Guard and Reserve by minimizing
1

Steve Vogel, Returning Military Members Allege Job Discrimination-by Federal Government, WASH. POST, Feb.
19
2012,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/returning-military-members-allege-jobdiscrimination--by-federal-government/2012/01/31/gIQAXvYvNR_story.html.
2
Id.
3
See Ziober v. BLB Res., Inc., 839 F.3d 814 (9th Cir. Cal. 2016).
4
Id. at 815-816.
5
Id. at 816.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id. at 817.
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the disruption to service member’s civilian employment due to military service; (2) to minimize
disruption to the service member’s employers, family, community and coworkers by providing
for prompt reemployment upon return; and (3) to prohibit discrimination in employment and
reemployment against National Guard and Reserve members due to their military service. 12
Section 4302 of USERRA speaks of USERRA’s relation to other law and plans or agreements:
(a) Nothing in this chapter shall supersede, nullify or diminish any Federal or
State law (including any local law or ordinance), contract, agreement, policy,
plan, practice, or other matter that establishes a right or benefit that is more
beneficial to, or is in addition to, a right or benefit provided for such person in this
chapter. (b) This chapter supersedes any State law (including any local law or
ordinance), contract, agreement, policy, plan, practice, or other matter that
reduces, limits, or eliminates in any manner any right or benefit provided by this
chapter, including the establishment of additional prerequisites to the exercise of
any such right or the receipt of any such benefit. 13
The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) was first enacted in 1925. It codifies the federal policy of
enforcing arbitration agreements. 14 The FAA’s “primary purpose . . . was to make arbitration
agreements enforceable in federal court.” 15 This article will address how these two federal
statutes are incompatible, as well as the negative implications of violating USERRA.
This article will address the history, background, and purpose of USERRA, as well as the
legislative history of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). These two federal statutes are in
conflict when employers contractually obligate their service members to arbitration in violation
of their USERRA rights. Specifically, USERRA’s non-waiver provision and the FAA are
incompatible. The Eleventh Circuit Court in Bodine v. Cook’s Pest Control addressed this issue
head on. 16 This article’s position is that the dissent in Bodine applied the proper legal analysis.
Next, this article will review the legislative histories of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). USERRA’s antidiscrimination provisions are similar to the EEOC legislation and lends itself to a comparison.
Finally, this article will discuss the negative implications of violating USERRA and the proposed
changes in order to negate these issues.

12

38 U.S.C., § 4301 (2012).
38 U.S.C. § 4302 (2012).
14
Asa Lopatin, What Constitutes Arbitration for Federal Arbitration Act Purposes?, ABA: ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION (June 16, 2014), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/adr/articles/spring2014-0614federal-arbitration-act.html.
15
Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the Legislative History of the Federal Arbitration
Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101, 106 (2002).
16
Bodine v. Cook's Pest Control Inc., 830 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2016).
13
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BACKGROUND

This section will review both USERRA and the FAA. The history of USERRA will be discussed,
including the purpose of USERRA and how the statute operates. Then, an in-depth analysis of
the legislative history of the FAA will be discussed.
A. USERRA
Protecting civilian employment started with the Selective Service Training Act of 1940
(“SSTA”). The SSTA was amended over 25 times and the Supreme Court has interpreted it in 18
cases – yet SSTA’s fundamental premise has remained constant: protect our national security
and ensure that people who serve are not disadvantaged by serving. 16 With every major conflict,
the SSTA has been changed. 17 Further, after the first Gulf War, the SSTA was completely
revamped with the passage of new legislation — USERRA. 18 USERRA was passed in response
to reports of firings, layoffs, and other adverse employment actions taken against deployed
National Guard and Reserve component members from the first Gulf War. 19 USERRA is the
most comprehensive legislation yet aimed at protecting citizen-soldiers, and it is more effective
in this regard than any of its predecessors. 20 USERRA expanded upon previous laws to provide
anti-discrimination protection, reemployment rights, and protections for National Guard and
Reserve members. 21
Regulations provided by USERRA are fundamental to ensure the protection of citizen-soldiers.22
Historically, the military has relied on citizen-soldiers to supplement the active-duty troops to
ensure that the U.S. military is appropriately armed. 23 Today, every branch of the military has a
Reserve component. 24 The purpose of each Reserve component is to “provide trained units and
qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national
emergency, and at such other times as the national security may require, to fill the needs of the
armed forces whenever more units and persons are needed than are in the regular components.”
25
As part of the Reserve component, the National Guard performs a unique role in military
readiness-states forces that can also be called to federal military service. 26 The Reserve
component members include Air and Army National Guard and reserves from each of the five
branches of the armed forces; these individuals are part time civilians, part time soldiers. 27 These
16

THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, LEGAL GUIDE FOR MILITARY FAMILIES (2013).
Id.
18
Id.
19
BRIAN CLAUSS & STACEY RAE SIMCOX, SERVICEMEMBER AND VETERANS RIGHTS, (Lexis Nexis 2014).
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, LEGAL GUIDE FOR MILITARY FAMILIES, 257 (2013).
23
David Segal & Mady Wechsler Segal, Population Reference Bureau, U.S. Military’s Reliance on the Reserves,
(March 2005), http://www.prb.org/Publications/Articles/2005/USMilitarysRelianceontheReserves.aspx.
24
National Center for PTSD, Active Duty vs. Reserve or National Guard, Apr. 6, 2012, http://www.va.gov/vets
inworkplace/docs/em_activeReserve.html.
25
10 U.S.C § 10102 (2004).
26
THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, LEGAL GUIDE FOR MILITARY FAMILIES, 257 (2013).
27
David Segal & Mady Wechsler Segal, Population Reference Bureau, U.S. Military’s Reliance on the Reserves,
(March 2005), http://www.prb.org/Publications/Articles/2005/USMilitarysRelianceonthe Reserves.aspx.
17
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reserve forces are critical to the military’s total forces.” 28 While the National Guard and Reserve
components have historically been criticized for being “part-time, volunteers who are poorly
trained, poorly funded and under equipped,” 29 the end of the 20th and beginning of the 21st
centuries saw the National Guard become an operational reserve, and both the National Guard
and the Reserve components have been deployed in record numbers. 30 The Reserve components
are a critical aspect of national security. 31 “Whether flying supply and logistics support
missions, acting as the federal government’s first response force at home, or supporting
active-duty forces during combat engagements overseas, these components have enabled
and enhanced the U.S. Military’s overall capabilities and capacities.” 32 Hundreds of thousands
of National Guard and Reserve component members have been activated since 9/11. 33
Studies have found a correlation between mental health issues, the number of times deployed,
and the length of time deployed in war zones. 34 National Guard and Reserve component
members returning from deployment experience mental health issues at a rate more than 50%
higher than their active duty counterparts. 35 Although suicide rates among active duty members
have lessened, those rates have increased among National Guard and Reserve component
members. 36
Both the National Guard and the Reserves are critical operational reserves and will continue to
be used by the Department of Defense. 37 General Jack Stultz, former Chief of the Army Reserve,
testified to Congress that the Army “has to have an operational reserve[s][.] Just in raw numbers,
75 percent of your engineering capabilities[,] 80 percent of your logistics capability[,] 75 percent
of your medical capability[,] 85 percent of your civil affairs capability, which is in high demand,
is in the reserve or the Guard.” 38 General Harry Wyatt, former Director of the Air National
28

Patty Ritchie, Military Reserves Critical to Our Nation’s Defense (June 27, 2011), https://www.nysenate.gov/
newsroom/articles/patty-ritchie/military-reserves-critical-our-nations-defense.
29
Brain Clauss, Protecting Civilian Employment Providing Healthcare to the Citizen Soldier in the National Guard
and Reserve Components, 45 U. MEM. L. REV. 915, 917 (2015).
30
Id. at 927; See Ryan Wedlund, Citizen Soldiers Fighting Terrorism: Reservists’ Reemployment Rights, 30 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 797, 801 (2004).
31
Col. Richard J. Dunn III, America’s Reserve and National Guard Components: Key Contributors to U.S. Military
Strength, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (2016).
32
Id.
33
See Michele A. Forte, Reemployment Rights for the Guard and Reserve: Will Civilian Employers Pay the Price
for National Defense?, 59 A.F.L. REV. 287, 289 (2007) (discussing that from September 11, 2001, to 2007,
“approximately 517,000 Reserve component members of the United States military ha[d] been mobilized in support
of Operations Noble Easle, Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom”).
34
Olumpia Duhart, Soldiers Suicides and Outcrit Jurisprudence: An Anti-Subordination Analysis, 44 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 883, 889-91 (2011).
35
Lauren Everitt et al., Efforts Lag to Improve Care for National Guard, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2012,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/national-security/efforts-lag-to-improve-care-for-nationalguard/2012/02/04/gIQAymEWER_story.html?utm_term=.ad0574ed1ab3.
36
Id.
37
John A. Nagl & Travis Sharp, Operational for What' The Future of the Guard and Reserves, Sept. 28, 2010,
https://www.army.mil/article/45819/operational_for_what_the_future_of_the_guard_and_reserves (last visited 16
Nov 17)
38
Sgt. John Orrell, Nat. Guard Bureau, Guard Leaders or House Subcommittee: National Guard should Remain
Operational Reserve, (Apr. 7, 2011), http://www.nationalguard.mil/News/ArticleView/Article/60128 9/guardleaders-to-house-subcommittee-national-guard-should-remain-operational-re/.
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Guard, also testified, “The Air National Guard provides about 34 percent of the total capability
of the Air Force on about 7 percent of the budget . . . That’s probably the most cost-effective arm
of the Air Force that we have.” 39 With the current political climate focused on cutting the
defense budget, the Guard and Reserve components will allow for a lower defense budget,
without limiting the capability of our armed forces. 40 With the increase role of the citizen-soldier
in operational readiness, the role of USERRA cannot be overstated. 41
Unlike other employment laws that are “justified under the commerce clause, USERRA was
enacted pursuant to the War Powers Clause of the U.S. Constitution.”42 It also distinguishes the
federal government because of its special role in employing citizen-soldiers. 43 38 U.S.C. Section
4302(b) states “the sense of Congress that the Federal Government should be a model employer
in carrying out the provisions of this chapter.” 44
USERRA accomplishes these purposes by providing protection in two ways: (1) antidiscrimination; (2) and reemployment rights. 45 The anti-discrimination provisions of 18 U.S.C. §
4311prohibit discrimination in employment based on prior military service or obligations. 46 The
reemployment provisions of 38 U.S.C. § 4312 address the return-to-work rights of service
members who performed military service in the National Guard and Reserve component. 47
USERRA covers virtually all U.S. employers, including private employers, regardless of size, as
well as federal, state, and municipal governments, for-profit, non-profits, and general contractors
and their sub-contractors. 48 The anti-discrimination protection applies to “any person employed
by an employer: who voluntarily or involuntarily ‘is a member of, applies to be a member of,
performs, has performed, applies to perform, or has an obligation to perform service in a
uniformed service.’” 49 However, USERRA does not supersede any law, regulation, or collective
bargaining agreement that provides for greater rights than those granted by USERRA. 50
Conversely, USERRA does supersede any state statute, regulation, or collective bargaining
agreement that restricts USERRA rights or places additional requirements upon the service

39

Id.
John A. Nagl & Travis Sharp, Operational for What' The Future of the Guard and Reserves, Sept. 28, 2010,
https://www.army.mil/article/45819/operational_for_what_the_future_of_the_guard_and_reserves.
41
Charles Lathrop, The Army's Unsung Heroes: Full-Time Support to the Army National Guard, Association of the
US Army (July 3, 2000), https://www.ausa.org/publications/army%E2%80%99s-unsung-heroes-full-time-supportarmy-national-guard-and-army-reserve.
42
See U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cl 11.
43
Id.
44
38 U.S.C. § 4301(b) (2000).
45
38 U.S.C. § 4311-4312 (2012).
46
Coffman v. Chugach Support Servs., 411 F.3d 1231, 1234 (11th Cir. 2005).
47
Leib v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 925 F.2d 240, 242 (8th Cir. 1991).
48
38 U.S.C § 4303(4) (2012). There are certain exemptions for certain federal agencies that work on national
defense. See 20 C.F.R. §1002.34 (2006).
49
38 U.S.C. § 4303(3) (2012).
50
38 U.S.C. § 4302(a) (2012).
40
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member. 51 In addition to the widespread protection provided, enforcing those rights also comes
with no statute of limitations for USERRA claims. 52
USERRA prevents employment discrimination against an individual based on service in the
Reserve or Guard. 53 Section 4311 states, in pertinent part, that:
(a) A person who is a member of, applies to be a member of, performs, has
performed, applies to perform, or has an obligation to perform service in a
uniformed service shall not be denied initial employment, reemployment,
retention in employment, promotion, or any benefit of employment by an
employer on the basis of that membership, application for membership,
performance of service, application for service, or obligation. 54
In essence, this means that an individual is qualified under this statute if s/he is a member of the
armed forces. 55 Said individual cannot be denied employment, promotions, or any benefit of
employment due to their service: 56
(b) An employer may not discriminate in employment against or take any adverse
employment action against any person because such person (1) has taken an
action to enforce a protection afforded any person under this chapter, (2) has
testified or otherwise made a statement in or in connection with any
proceeding under this chapter, (3) has assisted or otherwise participated in an
investigation under this chapter, or (4) has exercised a right provided for in
this chapter. 57
This section means that an employer cannot discriminate against an individual if said individual
takes any action to enforce their rights under this statute. 58 Under USERRA, an employer is
defined as “any person, institution or organization, or other entity that pays salary or wages for
work performed or that has control over employment opportunities.” 59 The broad definition also
includes any entity that has been “delegated the performance of employment-related
responsibilities” such as a successor in interest, regardless of whether the successor knew of the
possible USERRA claim at the time of the merger or acquisition. 60 This also includes
government contractors 61 and union hiring halls. 62 Section (c)(1) of USERRA provides that

51

38 U.S.C. § 4302(b) (2012).
38 U.S.C. § 4327(d) (2012).
53
THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, LEGAL GUIDE FOR MILITARY FAMILIES, 258 (2013).
54 38 U.S.C. § 4311(a) (2002).
55 See Montoya v. Orange County Sheriff's Dep't, 987 F. Supp. 2d 981, 1008 (C.D. Cal. 2013).
56 Id.
57 38 U.S.C. § 4311(b) (2002).
58 See Francis v. Booz, Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 452 F.3d 299, 302 (4th Cir. Va. 2006).
59 38 U.S.C. § 4303(4)(a) (2002).
60 20 C.F.R. §1002.36 (2006).
61 20 C.F.R. §1002.37 (2006).
62 20 C.F.R. §1002.38 (2006).
52
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(c) An employer shall be considered to have engaged in actions prohibited (1) under subsection (a), if the person's membership, application for membership,
service, application for service, or obligation for service in the uniformed services
is a motivating factor in the employer's action, unless the employer can prove that
the action would have been taken in the absence of such membership, application
for membership, service, application for service, or obligation for service; or 63
Section (c), subsection (1) means that an employer cannot use an individual’s service in the
armed forces as a motivating factor in the employer’s decision to fire an individual. 64 The only
exception to this is if the employer can prove that, regardless of the individual’s service, the
same action would have occurred: 65 Section (c)(2) states that
if the person's (A) action to enforce a protection afforded any person under this
chapter, (B) testimony or making of a statement in or in connection with any
proceeding under this chapter, (C) assistance or other participation in an
investigation under this chapter, or (D) exercise of a right provided for in this
chapter, is a motivating factor in the employer's action, unless the employer can
prove that the action would have been taken in the absence of such person's
enforcement action, testimony, statement, assistance, participation, or exercise of
a right. 66
Section (c), subsection (2) means that if an individual in the Armed Forces takes any action to
utilize this statute, the employer cannot use it as a motivating factor in the employer’s action
unless the employer can prove that this action would have been taken regardless. 67
An employer cannot discriminate in initial employment, reemployment after service, retention in
employment, promotion or any benefit of work. 68 Section 4311(c) was enacted in response to the
Supreme Court's ruling in Monroe v. Standard Oil Co. 69 Monroe held that “38 U.S.C.S. §
2021(b)(3) did not require an employer to provide preferential scheduling of work hours for an
employee who was absent from work to fulfill his military reserve obligations.” 70 USERRA
“liberalized this requirement by providing that a violation could be established if the individual's
military service was a ‘motivating factor’ in the discriminatory action, even if it was not the only
factor.” 71 In 2011, USERRA was amended to include protection against hostile work

63

38 U.S.C. § 4311 (2002).
See Montoya, 987 F. Supp. 2d 981, 1008 (C.D. Cal. 2013).
65 See. Id.
66 38 U.S.C. § 4311 (2002).
67 See Francis, 452 F.3d at 302.
68 THE AMERICAN B AR ASSOCIATION, LEGAL GUIDE FOR MILITARY FAMILIES, 258 (2013).
69 Monroe, 452 U.S. at 559 (held that under the VRRA, allegations of discrimination in employment based upon
military service could be proven only if the employee could establish that the discrimination was motivated solely
by reserve status).
70 Monroe, 452 U.S. at 551.
71 Sheehan v. Dep't of Navy, 240 F.3d 1009, 1012-13 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Woodard v. N.Y. Health & Hosps. Corp.,
554 F. Supp. 2d 329, 348 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
64
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environments on the basis of military status. 72 The phrase Congress added––"terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment"––directly mirrors the language under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. 73 In 1986, the Supreme Court found that “this language permitted a plaintiff to
assert a hostile work environment claim in a Title VII case.” 74 Because Congress is “presumed to
understand the legal import of words it uses in light of existing case law,” the Court found that,
“by adding this particular phrase Congress intended to ensure that plaintiffs are able to bring
hostile work environment claims under USERRA.” 75
Further, an employer is prohibited from retaliating against a member of the armed services for
bringing enforcement action under the USERRA. 76 Otherwise stated, an employee cannot be
subjected to an adverse employment action because the employee acted to bring a claim for
USERRA protection, has assisted an investigation of a USERRA matter, or exercised a
USERRA right. 77 USERRA “requires the complaining soldier or veteran to demonstrate only
that his or her military service was a motivating factor in an adverse employment action.” 78
(emphasis added.) Once the plaintiff has discharged his initial burden of establishing a prima
facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to “the employer . . . to come forward with
evidence to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the employer would have taken the
adverse action anyway, for a valid reason.” 79 This means that an employee who makes a
discrimination claim under USERRA bears the initial burden of showing, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that his military service was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse
employment action. 80 If the employee makes that prima facie showing, the employer can avoid
liability by demonstrating, as an affirmative defense, that it would have taken the same action
without regard to the employee's military service. 81 Therefore, an employer violates Section
4311 if it would not have taken the adverse employment action but for the employee's military
service or obligation. 82

72

Veterans’ Benefit Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 112-56, § 251.
See Montoya v. Orange County Sheriff's Dep't, 987 F. Supp. 2d 981, 1012 (C.D. Cal. 2013); see 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2 (1991) (stating that it is unlawful to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin).
74 Montoya, 987 F. Supp. 2d at 1012-12; see Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) ("[T]he
phrase terms, conditions, or privileges of employment in Title VII is an expansive concept which sweeps within its
protective ambit the practice of creating a working environment heavily charged with ethnic or racial
discrimination.").
75 Montoya, 987 F. Supp. 2d at 1013.
76
38 U.S.C. § 4311 (2012).
77
Escher v. BWXT Y-12, 627 F.3d 1020 (6th Cir. 2010).
78
See 38 U.S.C. § 4311(c)(1) (2012); Hance v. Norfolk S. Ry., 571 F.3d 511, 518 (6th Cir. 2009).
79
Sheehan v. Dep't of Navy, 240 F.3d 1009, 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
80
Erickson v. U.S. Postal Serv., 571 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
81
Erickson, 571 F.3d at 1368; Velazquez-Garcia v. Horizon Lines Of Puerto Rico, Inc., 473 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir.
2007).
82
See Erickson, 571 F.3d at 1368 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 103-65, at 24 (1993), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2449,
2457).
73
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B. FAA
Arbitration is a “creature of contract between parties who have willingly agreed to resolve their
disputes outside the courts. It is encouraged by the legal system as a fast, cheap, and informal
alternative to litigation.” 83 In enacting § 2 of the FAA, Congress declared a “national policy
favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the
resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.” 84 The FAA
provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or
any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing
controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract. 85
Congress enacted the FAA, which was then called the Unites States Arbitration Act, in 1925.86
The Act was a result of years of drafting and lobbying by business groups and the ABA. 87 The
ABA Committee on Commerce, Trade, and Commercial Law “prepared the original draft of the
bill, and Congress enacted it into law with only minor amendments.” 88 At the time the FAA was
enacted, Swift v. Tyson, which held that federal diversity actions were free to ignore the common
law of the state that resulted in forum shopping, was still good law. 89 At this point in time, “rules
governing the enforcement of arbitration agreements were seen as procedural, not substantive,
and so were governed by the law of the forum.” 90 It wasn’t until after the Supreme Court’s 1956
decision in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., that the Court recognized the enforceability of
agreements to arbitrate as a substantive matter to be governed by state law in federal diversity
cases that go beyond the scope of the FAA. 91
The primary purpose of the FAA was to “make arbitration agreements enforceable in federal
courts.” 92 Congress intended “more comprehensive objectives” than adopting rules applicable
only in federal court: “The purpose of this bill is to make valid and enforceable agreements for
83

Aaron Bayer, Arbitration Appeals, NAT’L L. J. (June 28, 2004), http://www.wiggin.com/4801; see e.g. Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 632 (1985).
84
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (U.S. 1984).
85
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2015).
86
Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the Legislative History of the Federal Arbitration
Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101, 125 (2002).
87
3 Ian R. Macneil et al., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS, & REMEDIES UNDER FEDERAL
ACT, 84-101 (1994).
88
Id. at 84-91.
89
Swift v. Tyson,41 U.S. 1 (1842).
90
Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the Legislative History of the Federal Arbitration
Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101, 126 (2002).
91
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198, 203-04 (1956).
92
Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the Legislative History of the Federal Arbitration
Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101, 105 (2002).
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arbitration contained in contracts involving interstate commerce or within the jurisdiction or
admiralty, or which may be the subject of litigation in the federal courts.” 93 The “principle
purpose” of the FAA was to “require courts to enforce privately negotiated agreements to
arbitration, like other contracts, in accordance with their terms.” 94 Form contracts, otherwise
known as “contracts of adhesion,” consist of one party who offers terms on a non-negotiated,
“take-it-or-leave-it” basis. 95 These contracts are contrary to the intended purpose of the FAA.96
In fact, the legislative history of the FAA reveals that Congress intended it to target commercial
parties of generally comparable bargaining power rather than consumers or, by extension,
investors. 97 As Representative William Graham noted in the debate on the House floor in 1924,
“This bill simply provides for one thing, and that is to give an opportunity to enforce an
agreement in commercial contracts and admiralty contracts — an agreement to arbitrate, when
voluntarily placed in the document by the parties to it.” 98 Legislative history reveals that
Congress intended the FAA to cover disputes between merchants of approximately equal
strength 99 but not those involving disputes with workers 100 or disputes where the arbitration
agreement could be considered an adhesion contract. 101
To the detriment of the consumer, the Supreme Court has expanded the reach of the FAA over
the past 20 years to apply in contracts between parties of unequal bargaining power. 102 Congress
discussed this expansion during their 2009-2010 session. 103
Although arbitration was initially conceived as a privately-run, voluntary process
for resolving disputes, mainly between businesses, written and oral testimony
from Congressional hearings during the 110th Congress indicated that the use of
arbitration had expanded in the last twenty years. Many businesses are now
requiring arbitration of disputes in their consumer, employment, and franchise
relationships. Ironically, during the passage of the Federal Arbitration Act,
Congress did not intend to allow binding arbitration agreements on individuals if
93

Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984).
Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. Of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior U., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989).
95
The Federal Arbitration Act and Access to Justice: Will Recent Supreme Court Decisions Undermine the Rights of
Consumers, Workers, and Small Businesses?: Hearing on S. 878 Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 113th
Cong. (2013) (statement of Mike Rothman, Comm’r Minn. Dep’t Com.), http://www.nasaa.org/28459/federalarbitration-act-access-justice-will-recent-supreme-court-decisions-undermine-rights-consumers-workers-smallbusinesses/.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
68 CONG. REC. 1931 (1924).
99
Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Hearing of S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before the J. Comm. of
Subcomms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 10 (1924).
100
Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal Commercial Arbitration: Hearing
on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 9, 14 (1923).
101
H.R. REP. NO. 111-712, at 128. (1924).
102
The Federal Arbitration Act and Access to Justice: Will Recent Supreme Court Decisions Undermine the Rights
of Consumers, Workers, and Small Businesses?: Hearing on S. 878 Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 113th
Cong. (2013) (statement of Mike Rothman, Comm’r Minn. Dep’t Com.), http://www.nasaa.org/28459/federalarbitration-act-access-justice-will-recent-supreme-court-decisions-undermine-rights-consumers-workers-smallbusinesses/.
103
H.R. REP. NO. 111-712, at 126.
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the contracts were between parties of unequal bargaining power. The secret nature
of arbitration, the ability of the drafter to dictate the terms of the arbitration
process, and the apparent loss of civil protections when compared to a court
proceeding have created controversy among consumer and employee advocates
and small business owners. 104
Because arbitration “avoids the public court system in favor of a private industry of arbitration
groups, individuals lose some of the benefits and rights associated with traditional litigation.”105
These benefits and rights include “lower initial financial hurdles, pretrial discovery, formal civil
procedure rules, proximity to the resolution forum, access to counsel, class action options, and
fairness.” 106 Arbitration clauses may even “negate the protection of some federal statutes.
Several recent developments necessitated the [Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative
Law] to hold hearings generally on arbitration.” 107 While there is a clear federal policy favoring
arbitration, 108 the original intent of the FAA and how it is currently being enforced are at odds.
III. ISSUE
This section of the article will discuss how USERRA and the FAA are incompatible. In
particular, USERRA’s non-waiver provision is incompatible as applied to arbitration agreements
with USERRA offending terms. The article will then discuss the Bodine case, which is a
particularly applicable case in regards to this issue. 113 This article contends that the dissent in the
Bodine case was correct in its analysis.
Next, the article will examine Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the EEOC, paying
particular attention to the statute’s legislative history. USERRA is often analyzed through the
employment law lens used in EEOC cases. Therefore, USERRA and the EEOC lend themselves
to comparison.
A. USERRA’s Non Waiver Provision and the FAA are Incompatible as Applied to Arbitration
Agreements with USERRA Offending Terms.
USERRA was drafted to supersede any contracts that reduce, limit, or eliminate any rights under
USERRA. 109 The statute specifically “supersedes any State law . . . , contract, agreement, policy,
plan, practice, or other matter that reduces, limits, or eliminates in any manner any right or
benefit provided by this chapter, including the establishment of additional prerequisites to the
exercise of any such right or the receipt of any such benefit.” 110 Arbitration agreements are
contracts, and the FAA placed “arbitration agreements on an even footing with all other

104

Id. at 55-56.
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
113
Bodine v. Cook's Pest Control Inc., 830 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2016).
109
38 U.S.C. § 4302(b) (2015).
110
Id.
105
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contracts.” 111 Accordingly, USERRA “supersedes any arbitration agreements that abrogate in
any manner the rights provided by the USERRA as described in the text of the statute.” 112 The
Supreme Court has held that by entering into an arbitration agreement “covering statutory
claims, a party does not relinquish his or her substantive rights provided by the statute. Instead,
the party simply submits the determination of those rights to an arbitral rather than a judicial
forum.” 113
The House Report on Section 4302(a) of the USERRA states that Section 4302(b) would
“reaffirm a general preemption as to State and local laws and ordinances, as well as to employer
practices and agreements, which provide fewer rights or otherwise limit rights provided under
amended chapter 43 or put additional conditions on those rights.” 114 Furthermore, this section
would reaffirm that utilizing tools such as grievance procedures or arbitration or similar
administrative appeals is not required. 115 It is the “Committee's intent that, even if a person
protected under the Act resorts to arbitration, any arbitration decision shall not be binding as a
matter of law.” 116 The Committee further stressed that rights under chapter 43 “belong to the
claimant, and he or she may waive those rights, either explicitly or impliedly, through conduct.
Because of the remedial purposes of chapter 43, any waiver must, however, be clear, convincing,
specific, unequivocal, and not under duress.” 117 Additionally, “Only known rights which are
already in existence may be waived. An express waiver of future statutory rights, such as one
that an employer might wish to require as a condition of employment, would be contrary to the
public policy embodied in the Committee bill and would be void.” 118 Thus, the Congressional
intent behind “the USERRA is clear: Section 4302(b) was intended to preempt employeremployee agreements that limit rights provided under the USERRA or put additional conditions
on those rights.” 119
The House Report demonstrates Congress’s intent that an “arbitration decision would not be
binding in this situation, even if a person covered by the USERRA resorted to arbitration.”120
Specifically, that subsection supersedes any agreement that imposes additional “prerequisites to
the exercise of any . . . right or the receipt of any . . . benefit” provided by the act. 121 Thus, given
the language of Section 4302(b) and the legislative history of USERRA, the Supreme Court has
held that USERRA grants those “covered by it the right to pursue their claims in a judicial forum
and that the USERRA preempts arbitration agreements purportedly covering claims arising
under the USERRA.” 122

111

Anders v. Hometown Mortg. Servs., 346 F.3d 1024, 1032 (11th Cir. 2003).
Breletic v. CACI, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1334 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
113
Id. at 1336; see Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
114
H.R. REP. NO. 103-65 (1994), as reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 2453.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
H.R. REP. NO. 103-65 (1994), as reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 2453.
119
Breletic v. CACI, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1336 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
120
Id.
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38 U.S.C. § 4302(b) (1994).
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Breletic, 413 F. Supp. 2d at 1337.
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B. A Case Study—The Bodine Case
In Bodine, Plaintiff-Appellant Rodney Bodine was an employee of Defendant-Appellee Cook’s
Pest Control from 2012 to 2014, during “which time he also served in the United States Army
Reserve.” 129 Bodine’s “commitment to the armed forces required him to periodically take leave
from work to attend drills and training.” 123 Bodine alleged that his supervisor, Max Fant,
“repeatedly discriminated against him on the basis of his military service by making negative
comments about his military obligations, encouraging him to leave the Army Reserve, taking
work away from him while he was at drills and training, and eventually firing him in retaliation
for continued military service.” 124 The case required the Court to “interpret the non-waiver
provision of USERRA as it relates to the FAA and enforcement of an arbitration agreement with
terms purportedly in conflict with USERRA.” 125
Bodine argued that the arbitration agreement was “unenforceable because the arbitration
agreement itself contained two terms that violated USERRA: (1) the limitation on the
employee’s arbitration costs, with opportunity for the arbitrator to re-apportion costs and
attorney’s fees in the arbitrator’s final order (fee term); and (2) the six-month statute of
limitations (statute of limitations term).” 126 USERRA states that there is “no statute of limitations
for bringing a USERRA claim and no imposition of court costs or fees may be charged to a
USERRA plaintiff.” 127 Cook’s conceded that these two terms “ran afoul of USERRA, but argued
that the Contract’s severability clause could be used to remove the invalid terms from the
arbitration agreement while retaining and enforcing the remainder, pursuant to the FAA.” 128
Bodine responded that USERRA’s non-waiver provision, 38 U.S.C. § 4302(b), “precluded
enforcement of the arbitration agreement, despite the FAA, because the plain language of §
4302(b) prevents enforcement of any agreement that contains terms that reduce substantive
USERRA rights, and the fee term and statute of limitations term reduced Bodine’s substantive
USERRA rights.” 129 The district court ruled in favor of Cook’s, severing the violating terms of
the arbitration agreement while enforcing the remainder pursuant to the FAA. 130 However, the
district court did not address the role or scope of USERRA’s non-waiver provision or its
relationship to the FAA. 131
On appeal, Bodine renewed the same argument, contending that the district court erred by
“failing to apply the plain language of USERRA’s non-waiver provision.” 132 Bodine argued that
the “arbitration agreement would be unenforceable, as a whole, because the plain language of
that subsection states that USERRA ‘supersedes’ any ‘agreement’ that ‘limit[s], reduce[s], or
129

Bodine v. Cook’s Pest Control Inc., 830 F.3d 1320, 1323 (11th Cir. 2016).
Id.
124
Id.
125
Id. at 1322.
126
Id. at 1323.
127
Id.; see 38 U.S.C. § 4323(H)(l), § 4327(b) (2008).
128
Bodine, 830 F.3d at 1323.
129
Id.
130
Id. at 1323 -1324.
131
Id. at 1324.
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eliminate[s]’ any rights protected under USERRA, and the arbitration agreement contains
USERRA-offensive terms.” 133 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held
that the “[c]ontract’s arguable delegation clause –– which would require that the arbitrator, rather
than the court, determine whether the arbitration agreement is enforceable –– does not control
this appeal.” 134 In determining whether the arbitration agreement is enforceable, The Eleventh
Circuit concluded that “§ 4302(b) is not in conflict with the FAA and the district court properly
determined the arbitration agreement is enforceable.” 135
This article’s position is that the majority was incorrect in its analysis and that the dissent,
written by Circuit Judge Martin, was correct in its analysis. 136 The majority was wrong two
ways. First, “the majority interpret[ed] 38 U.S.C. § 4302(b) in a way that is not consistent with
the statute’s plain text. Second, the majority [gave] the defendants more than they asked for –– a
second chance to apply contract terms that admittedly violate USERRA. In both ways, the
majority weaken[ed] the rights of veterans based on a statute intended to give them strength.” 137
The majority interpreted § 4302(b) as “invalidating only the pieces of an agreement that violate
USERRA, rather than the whole agreement.” 138 However, as the dissent points out, when the text
of the statute is not ambiguous, “[courts] have no call to substitute what [they] think might be a
more reasonable reading of a statute –– rather, ‘[they] must apply the statute according to its
terms.’” 139
Section 4302(b) reads, “This chapter supersedes any State law (including any local law or
ordinance), contract, agreement, policy, plan, practice, or other matter that reduces, limits, or
eliminates in any manner any right or benefit provided by this chapter, including the
establishment of additional prerequisites to the exercise of any such right or the receipt of any
such benefit.” 140 In light of its plain language, the dissent argued that the “statute supersedes
‘any . . . contract [or] agreement,’ not merely the illegal pieces of a contract or agreement,”141
and that nowhere “does the statute include the limitation found by the majority.” 142 Everything
listed in §4302(b) (“law . . . , contract, agreement, policy, plan, practice or other matter”) is a
“whole, not a piece of a larger whole (for example, ‘contract provision’ or ‘term of
agreement’). 143 Despite knowing “how to limit the scope of a non-waiver provision, Congress
chose not to in USERRA, and [courts] should understand that choice as deliberate.” 144 Congress
plainly said the statute supersedes “contract[s]” and “agreements[s]” that reduce USERRA
rights. 145
133
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It would seem that USERRA’s purpose to “vigorously protect veterans” rights would be better
served by superseding more than just the illegal terms (though not any “more beneficial” terms)
because doing so deters employer overreaching.” 146 Under the majority’s interpretation of §
4302(b), “employers will have nothing to lose by including illegal terms in their contracts —
even if a legally learned veteran does recognize the illegal terms as such (hardly a foregone
conclusion), the worst that can happen to the employer is delicate removal of only the illegal
terms.” 147 In Bodine, this meant that the defendants were still able to “arbitrate Mr. Bodine's case
even though they drafted an arbitration agreement that infringed on his USERRA rights. The
employer suffers no penalty for its bad drafting.” 148 Under the majority’s interpretation, “even
when employers don’t get the unfair benefit of their illegal terms because employees like Mr.
Bodine recognize the terms’ illegality, USERRA will do nothing to dissuade employers from
continuing to use those illegal terms in the future. This result surely does not ‘provide the
greatest benefit to our servicemen and women.’” 149
The majority in Bodine further eroded veterans’ rights by giving the defendants more than they
asked for. 150 The defendants “acknowledge[d] that certain provisions of the arbitration
agreement violate USERRA.” 151 Yet, the majority opinion gave them an “unrequested second
change to apply these admitted illegal contract terms.” 152 This specifically refers to the “fee
term” and the “statute of limitations term,” both of which explicitly violate USERRA. 153 The
majority opinion “reache[d] out and t[ook] away not just the federal courts’ ability to supersede
illegal ‘contract[s]’ or ‘agreement[s]’ (as the statute says), but the courts’ ability to supersede
even the clearly illegal pieces of those contracts.” 154
Veterans’ rights statutes “preceding USERRA stretch back to World War II and ‘provide[ ] the
mechanism for manning the Armed Forces of the United States.’” 155 Veterans’ rights statutes
“thus occupy a domain of special national importance, and our courts should not lightly be
stripped of the power to enforce them.” 156 Under the majority’s decision in Bodine, the “worst to
happen to overreaching employers will be a delicate removal of just their illegal terms. Veterans,
on the other hand, may lose their USERRA rights without redress.” 157 In the case of a fee term
like the one found in Bodine, “A veteran might be forced to pay mandatory mediation and
arbitration fees before she can prove (and if she can prove) to an arbitrator that USERRA has

146

Id. at 1331.
Id.
148
Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 1331-32.
151
Id. at 1332.
152
Id.
153
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been violated.” 158 In addition to the majority's “narrow, extra-textual interpretation of § 4302(b),
its decision to undo the District Court's severance of the clearly illegal terms walks back
veterans' rights rather than protecting them.” 159
C. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964’s in comparison to USERRA.
This section will examine Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (”Title VII”) and the EEOC,
looking specifically at the legislative history of Title VII. EEOC complaints and USERRA
violations are analyzed through the same employment lens. The second part of this section will
compare the two.
i. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the EEOC-a legislative history.
Title VII makes it unlawful to “discriminate against someone on the basis of race, color, national
origin, sex or religion. The Act also makes it unlawful to retaliate against a person because the
person complained about discrimination, filed a charge of discrimination, or participated in an
employment discrimination investigation or lawsuit.” 160 Title VII “prohibits not only intentional
discrimination, but also practices that have the effect of discriminating against individuals
because of their race, color, national origin, religion, or sex.” 161
Under Title VII, it is unlawful to discriminate in any aspect of employment, including: “hiring
and firing; compensation, assignment, or classification of employees; transfer, promotion, layoff,
or recall; job advertisements and recruitment; testing; use of company facilities; training and
apprenticeship programs; retirement plans, leave and benefits; or other terms and conditions of
employment.” 162
Title VII is not limited to the above list; there are other “discriminatory practices” that are also
illegal. 163 Those practices include:
harassment on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex or religion; refusal or
failure to reasonably accommodate an individual’s sincerely held religious
observances or practices, unless doing so would impose an undue hardship on the
operation of the employer’s business; employment decisions based on stereotypes
or assumptions about the abilities, traits, or performance of individuals of a
certain race, color, national origin, sex or religion; and denial of employment
opportunities to an individual because of marriage to, or association with, an
individual of a particular race, color, national origin, sex or religion. 164
158

Id.
Id.
160
U.S. DEP’T JUST., Laws Enforced by the Employment Litigation Section, (Aug. 7, 2015) https://www.justice.gov
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Id.; see Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241.
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Complaints under Title VII are filed with the EEOC. Under Title VII, the Department of Justice
(“DOJ”) has “authority to prosecute enforcement actions against state and local government
employers upon referral by the EEOC of complaints arising under the Act.” 165 The DOJ also has
“authority to initiate investigations and prosecute enforcement actions against state and local
government employers where it has reason to believe that a ‘pattern or practice’ of employment
discrimination exists.”166
The EEOC is responsible for enforcing federal laws that make it illegal to discriminate against a
job applicant or an employee because of the person's race, color, religion, sex (including
pregnancy, gender identity, and sexual orientation), national origin, age (40 or older), disability
or genetic information. It is also illegal to discriminate against a person because the person
complained about discrimination, filed a charge of discrimination, or participated in an
employment discrimination investigation or lawsuit. 167
EEOC’s purpose is to address societal wrongs and to combat discrimination. 168 Although the
EEOC was created by Title VII, its mission “has been shaped by more than this one single piece
of legislation.” 169 In general, the EEOC is “responsible for enforcing federal laws that make it
illegal to discriminate against a job applicant or an employee because of the person's race, color,
religion, sex (including pregnancy, gender identity, and sexual orientation), national origin, age
(40 or older), disability or genetic information.” 170 Many laws and amendments, as well as a
handful of executive orders, have “expanded, limited or directed the Commission's
responsibilities and authority.” 171
In June 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive Order 8802, “prohibiting
government contractors from engaging in employment discrimination based on race, color or
national origin.” 172 This is the first presidential action ever taken to “prevent employment
discrimination by private employers holding government contracts.” 173 The order states that it
applies to “all defense contractors, but contains no enforcement authority.” 174 President
Roosevelt signed Executive Order 0082 mainly to “ensure that there are no strikes or
demonstrations disrupting the manufacture of military supplies as the country prepares for
War.” 175
Another example of presidential action to end discrimination occurred in July 1948, when
President Harry S. Truman ordered the desegregation of the armed forces by Executive Order
165
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U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, Overview, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/index.cfm.
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9981. 176 The order requires that there be "equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in
the armed services without regard to race, color, religion or national origin.” 177 However, U.S.
armed forces were not actually integrated until the Korean War began in 1952. 178
Further, in March 1961, President John F. Kennedy signed Executive Order 10925, which
prohibits “federal government contractors from discriminating on account of race and
establishing the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity.” 179 Departing from
previous presidential directives, this order grants the Committee, initially chaired by Vice
President Lyndon B. Johnson, authority to “impose sanctions for violations of the Executive
Order.” 180 President Kennedy stated that enforcement authority provided by the order signaled a
new “determination to end job discrimination once and for all.” 181
Two years later, The Equal Pay Act of 1963 (EPA) was passed. 182 The EPA was enacted to
“protect men and women who ‘perform substantially equal work in the same establishment from
sex-based wage discrimination.’” 183 The EPA was an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards
Act. 184 The EPA is the first national civil rights legislation focusing on employment
discrimination. 185
The following year, The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted. 186 It prohibits “discrimination in
a broad array of private conduct including public accommodations, governmental services and
education.” 187 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 also created the EEOC, a “five-member,
bipartisan commission whose mission is to eliminate unlawful employment discrimination.”188
Title VII provides that, “Commissioners, no more than three of whom may be from the same
political party, are appointed to five-year terms by the President and confirmed by the Senate.”189
The Chairman of the agency “appoints the General Counsel. EEOC is to open its doors for
business on July 2, 1965 –– one year after Title VII's enactment into law.” 190
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ii. EEOC in Comparison to USERRA.
USERRA’s anti-discrimination provisions are similar to those enforced by the EEOC. 191 Courts
tend to follow an employment law analysis in USERRA anti-discrimination cases. 192 In Staub v.
Proctor Hospital, 193 Mr. Staub was a member of the Army Reserves and was employed by
Proctor Hospital. 194 After he was fired by Proctor Hospital, Mr. Staub alleged that the reason he
was fired was due to his immediate supervisor’s disdain for his military status. 195 His supervisor
claimed that Mr. Staub violated an order, but Mr. Staub claimed that it was made up due to his
military service. 196 At trial, the jury found for Mr. Staub; however, the hospital appealed, arguing
there was an improper jury instruction on the “cat’s paw” theory of employer liability for
discrimination. 197 An employer “may be liable for discrimination in an adverse employment
decision against an employee where the ultimate decision maker is unbiased and has no
discriminatory motives.” 198 Under this theory, the “discriminatory motive of a non-decision
maker is imputed to the decision maker, and employer, where the discriminator has some
significant influence that leads to the adverse employment action.” 199 The Seventh Circuit held
that this theory did not apply, because the person who ultimately fired Mr. Staub made the
decision based on more than just the immediate supervisor. 200 The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the “cat’s paw” theory of employer liability applied and that, under it, the employer
was responsible because it relied on the supervisor’s recommendation, which was motivated by
anti-military spirit. 201
USERRA’s re-employment provisions are designed to ensure the service member returns from
their duty to their previous employment. 202 Importantly, this provision is to ensure the service
member returns to the position they would have held if they never left. 203 The EEOC investigates
workplace discrimination complaints under several anti-discrimination statutes. 204

191

See Michele A. Forte, Reemployment Rights for the Guard and Reserve: Will Civilian Employers Pay the Price
for National Defense?, 59 A.F.L. REV. 287, 294 (2007).
192
See Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411 (2011) (applying an employment law analysis on the employer liability
issue in the only USERRA case before the United States Supreme Court.)
193
Id.
194
Id.
195
Id.
196
Id.
197
See Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 415 (2011) (“meaning that he sought to hold his employer liable for
the animus of a supervisor who was not charged with making the ultimate employment decision”).
198
Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A., “Cat’s Paw” Theory of Liability, https://www.csklegal.com/news/cats-paw-theoryof-liability/.
199
Id.
200
Id. at 416.
201
Id. at 423.
202
BRIAN CLAUSS & STACEY RAE SIMCOX, SERVICEMEMBER AND VETERANS RIGHTS, (Lexis Nexis 2014).
203
32 C.F.R. § 104.3 (2014); see Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 285 (1946) (stating
that the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 “is to be liberally construed for the benefit of those who left
private life to serve their country in its hour of great need . . . [B]y these provisions Congress made the restoration as
nearly a complete substitute for the original job as was possible”).
204
See U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPP. COMM’N, Laws Enforced by EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/statutes/index.cfm
(last visited Nov. 17, 2016).
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Congress “did not intend to limit the sweep of Section 4302(b) to substantive rights and
benefits.” 205 Specifically, that subsection supersedes any agreement that imposes additional
"prerequisites to the exercise of any . . . right or the receipt of any . . . benefit" provided by the
USERRA. 206 Any contract or agreement does just that. 207 It mandates that, before “exercising
her rights under USERRA and obtaining the relief to which she is entitled thereunder, plaintiff
must participate in an arbitration proceeding.” 208 Nowhere in the USERRA did “Congress
provide for arbitration as a means to obtain the rights granted in the [USERRA].” 209 Instead,
Congress stated that a “person aggrieved under the [USERRA] can, but need not, seek assistance
from the Secretary of Labor and the United States Attorney General in resolving the dispute.”210
In addition to, or as “an alternative to, those avenues of relief, an aggrieved person is authorized
to bring a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court.” 211
An arbitration agreement mandates that plaintiff seek relief in an arbitral forum. 212 Because that
type of proceeding was not addressed in the USERRA, it stands as an “additional prerequisite to
the exercise of plaintiff's rights and the receipt of any benefits to which she might be entitled
under the act.” 213 Hence, the plain language of 38 U.S.C. § 4302(b) requires that the arbitration
agreement be superseded by the USERRA. 214
In Lopez v. Dillard’s, defendant argued against this conclusion, citing to examples of federal
employment statutes that “are subject to legitimate arbitration agreements.” 215 However, in
ruling against the defendant, the court in Lopez stated that it could find “no provisions in those
acts, nor has the court found any, that make such sweeping statements about superseding any
laws or agreements that undermine the goals of the enactments 216. . . . Indeed, none of these acts
contain any statement that remotely approaches the sweep of 38 U.S.C. § 4302(b), with its focus
on not only trampling any state law, contract, or agreement that diminishes any rights or benefits
protected by the USERRA, but with the additional emphasis on striking down any ‘prerequisites’
to the exercise of those protected rights.” 217

205

Lopez v. Dillard’s, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1248 (D. Kan. 2005).
38 U.S.C. § 4302(b) (2015).
207
Lopez, at 1248.
208
Id.
209
Id.
210
Id.; See 38 U.S.C. § 4322, §4323(a) (1991).
211
Lopez, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 1248; see 38 U.S.C. § 4323(b) (1991).
212
Id.
213
Id.
214
Id.
215
Id.
216
See e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 218 (2016) (discussing the construction of the act with
state and federal laws); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 633 (2016) (discussing the
construction of the act with state and federal laws); Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2651
(2016) (discussing the construction of the act with state and federal laws); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
2000h-4 (2016) (discussing construction of the act, including Title VII, with state laws); Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12201 (2016) (discussing construction of the act with state and federal laws).
217
Lopez v. Dillard’s, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1249 (D. Kan. 2005).
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Additional commentary on the legislative intent of USERRA is available in a committee report
from the House of Representatives’ comments on the interpretation of Section 4302(b). The
report states that, “Section 4302(b) would reaffirm a general preemption as to state and local
laws and ordinances, as well as to employer practices and agreements, which provide fewer
rights or otherwise limit rights provided under amended chapter 43 or put additional conditions
on those rights.” 218 Moreover, this section would reaffirm that “additional resort to mechanisms
such as grievance procedures or arbitration or similar administrative appeals is not
required.” 219
Although the hostile workplace provision is a well-established cause of action under Title VII
and has recently been applied under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the question
remains whether it is cognizable under USERRA. 220 In Carder v. Continental Airlines, the Fifth
Circuit held that USERRA legislation did not provide a cause of action for hostile work
environment claims based upon an employee’s military service. 227 The Carder Court noted that
USERRA was passed after both Title VII and the ADA and did not include language suggesting
that hostile work environment based upon military services was a cause of action. 228 Soon after
the Carder decision, in 2011, Congress passed the bipartisan VOW to Hire Heroes Act, which
included a provision that amended USERRA to include hostile work environment claims based
on military status. 221 Because USERRA includes anti-discriminatory language, courts may be
susceptible to automatically reliance upon Title VII's severe or pervasive test. 222 Title VII was
enacted for the purpose of remedying past wrongs and removing barriers experienced by
historically disadvantaged groups, whereas USERRA was intended to provide protections for the
purpose of encouraging military recruitment. 223 This difference is likely to become even more
crucial in the current political environment. 224
IV. SOLUTION
This section of the article will discuss the negative consequences of violating USERRA. Each
subsection will address a specific result of USERRA violations and a proposed change to avoid
it. The broader method to avoid many of these negative implications is to amend USERRA.

218

H.R. REP. NO. 103-65, at 20 (1993).
Id.
220
Konrad S. Lee, When Johnny Comes Marching Home Again Will He Be Welcome at Work?, 35 PEPP. L. REV.
247, 251 (2008) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006)); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986).
227
Carder v. Cont’l Airlines Inc., 636 F.3d 172 (5th Cir. 2011), superseded by statute, Pub. L. No. 112-56, 125 Stat.
711(codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. § 4303(2)).
228
Id.
221
H.R. 674, 112th Cong. (2011).
222
Konrad S. Lee, When Johnny Comes Marching Home Again Will He Be Welcome at Work?, 35 PEPP. L. REV.
247, 251 (2008) (citing Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986).
223
Id.; see EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (U.S. 1991).
224
Konrad S. Lee, When Johnny Comes Marching Home Again Will He Be Welcome at Work?, 35 PEPP. L. REV.
247, 251 (2008) (citing Robert Burns, Army Likely to Miss Year's Recruiting Goal; It Would Be the First Time Since
1999, PHILA. INQUIRER, June 9, 2005, at A17).
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A. Negative Implications of Violating USERRA.
Subsection (i) will discuss how violating USERRA hurts national security. Subsection (ii) will
discuss how rural service members are especially disadvantaged due to limited access to
attorneys and the justice system. Lastly, subsection (iii) will discuss the narrow scope of appeal
ability under the FAA and how this fails USERRA’s purpose.
i.

Violating USERRA Hurts National Security.

Due to an increased reliance on the Reserve/National Guard in a post 9/11 world, any violation
of USERRA ultimately hurts national security. 225 Since the end of the 20th and beginning of
the21st centuries, the National Guard and Reserve have been deployed at record numbers. 226 In
1903, Congress created the modern National Guard when it passed the Militia Act of 1903.The
modern National Guard serves a unique role, answering to both the state for state-specific
functions and the federal government when the National Guard is “federalized” under Army
command. 227
During World War I, the National Guard provided the largest number of combat divisions to the
American Expeditionary Force units stationed in France. 228 In World War II, the National Guard
doubled the size of the regular Army, and National Guard units were the first units to see combat
after the attack on Pearl Harbor. 229 The National Guard has been involved in Korea, Vietnam, the
first Gulf War, Haiti, and Bosnia. 230 Additionally, the National Guard were involved with the
invasion of Afghanistan and were a large percentage of the forces in Iraq. 231
Every branch of the Armed Forces also has a reserve component of part-time soldiers. 232 The
Army Reserve was created in 1908. 233 The Navy and Marine Reserves were created after the

225

Konrad S. Lee, When Johnny Comes Marching Home Again Will He Be Welcome at Work?, 35 PEPP. L. REV.
247, 251 (2008) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006)); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986).
226
See Ryan Wedlund, Citizen Soldiers Fighting Terrorism: Reservists’ Reemployment Rights, 30 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 797, 801 (2004) (“Today’s Reserve Components . . . are an integral part of the defense strategy and day-to-day
operations of the U.S. Military.” quoting Donald Rumsfeld, Sizing and Selectively Modernizing Forces for an Era
of Uncertainty, SEC’Y OF DEF. ANN REP. 63 (2002)).
227
Compare 10 U.S.C. § 332 (2012) (activation by the President), with 32 U.S.C. § 907 (2012) (activation by the
state for state-specific missions).
228
NAT’L GUARD, About the National Guard: Army National Guard, http://www.nationalguard.mil/AbouttheGu
ard/ArmyNationalGuard.aspx.
229
See e.g., MICH. DEP’T MIL. & VETERANS AFF., Michigan National Guard in World War II, http://www.michiga
n.gov/dmva/0,4569,7-126-2360_3003_3009-26798--,00.html.
230
LAWRENCE KAPP & BARBARA SALAZAR TORREON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS RL30802, RESERVE
COMPONENT PERSONAL ISSUES: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 8 (2014); see NAT’L GUARD, About the National
Guard: Army National Guard, http://www.nationalguard.mil/AbouttheGu ard/ArmyNationalGuard.aspx.
231
NAT’L GUARD, About the National Guard: Army National Guard, http://www.nationalguard.mil/AbouttheGu
ard/ArmyNationalGuard.aspx.
232
See Active Duty vs. Reserve or National Guard, VETERANS EMPLOYMENT TOOLKIT HANDOUT,
https://www.va.gov/vetsinworkplace/docs/em_activeReserve.html.
233
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outbreak of World War I and prior to United States entry into the conflict in 1917. 234 The Air
Force and Air Force Reserve were created after World War II. 235 The Coast Guard and Coast
Guard Reserve became a part of the Department of Homeland Security following 9/11. 236 Unlike
the National Guard, the Reserves do not answer to both the state and the federal government. 237
Reserve units or individual members can be called to active duty. 238
Since 9/11, hundreds of thousands of Guard and Reserve members have been activated. 239 In
September 2013, there were 1.1 million Reserve component members. 240 National Guard and
Reserve members are civilians first. 241 They are not “full-time soldiers and usually leave civilian
employment when deployed.” 242 They are being deployed more frequently and for longer
periods, and these deployments put a strain on their civilian employers while they are gone. 243
As the General Accounting Office Report 02-608 noted, “At every focus group in every unit
[GAO] visited, some reservists had complaints about their employers. Some said that their
supervisors were hostile toward their reserve duty and had actively encouraged them to leave the
reserves.” 244
Current National Guard and Reserve component members have been deployed for longer periods
of time and with less time between deployments than previous members. 245 National Guard and
Reserve component members returning from deployment experience mental health issues at a
rate more than fifty percent higher than their active duty counterparts. 246 The unemployment rate
for veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan is high, with a large number of those members being Guard

234

Navy Timeline, AMERICA’S NAVY, https://www.navy.com/about/history.html; Marine Corps Reserve History:
1916-2006, U.S. MARINE CORP., http://www.marforres.marines.mil/USMCR100/History/ (2006).
235
See National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 253, § 207-08, 61 Stat. 495, 502-03 (1947).
236
See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 888, 116 Stat. 2135 (stating that the Coast Guard is
considered a military service because the President can transfer Coast Guard assets to the Department of the Navy).
237
LAWRENCE KAPP & BARBARA SALAZAR TORREON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS RL30802, RESERVE
COMPONENT PERSONAL ISSUES: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 8 (2014); see NAT’L GUARD, About the National
Guard: Army National Guard, http://www.nationalguard.mil/AbouttheGuard/ArmyNationalGuard.aspx.
238
10 U.S.C. §§ 12303-12304 (2012).
239
See Michele A. Forte, Reemployment Rights for the Guard and Reserve: Will Civilian Employers Pay the Price
for National Defense?,59 A.F.L. REV. 287, 289 (2007).
240
LAWRENCE KAPP & BARBARA SALAZAR TORREON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS RL30802, RESERVE
COMPONENT PERSONAL ISSUES: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 4 (2014); see NAT’L GUARD, About the National
Guard: Army National Guard, http://www.nationalguard.mil/AbouttheGuard/ArmyNationalGuard.aspx.
241
Brain Clauss, Protecting Civilian Employment Providing Healthcare to the Citizen Soldier in the National Guard
and Reserve Components, 45 U. MEM. L. REV. 915, 917 (2015).
242
Id.
243
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO 02-608, Actions Needed to Better Manage Relations Between
Reservists and their Employers (2002) (stating that increased tempo and duration of deployment among reservists is
4.5 times longer than previously).
244
Id. at 16.
245
Sharon M. Erwin, When the Troops Come Home: Returning Reservists, Employers and the Law, HEALTH LAW. 1,
3 (2007).
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Lauren Everitt et al., Efforts Lag to Improve Care for National Guard, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2012,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/national-security/efforts-lag-to-improve-care-for-nationalguard/2012/02/04/gIQAymEWER_story.html (discussing Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center statistics).
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and Reservists. 247 Many Guard and Reservists have deployed multiple times since 9/11 only to
return to find that a recession has eliminated their job. 248 As a country, we depend on the
National Guard and Reservists as a part of our national security. It follows, then, that as a
country we should strive to remove as many of these negative qualities that currently flow from
being a member of the Guard or Reserves. 249
ii.

Rural Service Members with Limited Access to Attorney’s and Court Systems will also be
Negatively Affected by this due to Long Commute Times and the Cost Prohibitive Nature.

Rural America is disproportionately represented among National Guard and Reserve
members. 250 Pentagon figures show that more than 44% of military recruits come from rural
areas, as compared to 14% form major cities. 251 Many reasons are offered for the large numbers
of young people from rural communities who join the military. 252 When young people have “few
options––little chance for employment and no easy route to higher education––they are more
likely to join the military.” 253 A bad economy is good for military recruitment, especially in rural
communities, where jobs are scarce. 254 These service members particularly rely on their
employment in the Guard of Reserve. 255 They are being deployed “more frequently and for
longer periods, and these deployments put a strain on their civilian employers while they are
gone.” 256 The official unemployment rates for Reserve component members are unreliable or
nonexistent, but the lower estimates place the unemployment rate at over twice the national
average. 257 Anecdotal evidence suggests that the rate is much higher. 258 Veterans returning to
rural America are likely to find a worse employment situation than veterans returning to urban
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See Assoc. Press, Unemployment Rate for Young Veterans Hits 21.1 Percent, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2010,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/12/AR2010031204123.html.
248
See Samuel F. Wright & Greg T. Rinckey, Welcome Home, You're Fired, THE FREE LIBRARY, Apr. 1, 2008,
https://www.thefreelibrary.com/%27Welcome+home%2c+you%27re+fired%27%3a+a+harsh+reality+awaits+many
+returning...-a0178218681 (stating that "Hundreds of thousands of American troops are deployed overseas, and
when they return home to find their jobs off limits to them, they need diligent, competent counsel.").
249
Konrad S. Lee, When Johnny Comes Marching Home Again Will He Be Welcome at Work?, 35 PEPP. L. REV.
247, 277 (2008).
250
Alexandra Zavis, National Guard Soldiers and Airmen Face Unemployment Crisis, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2012,
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/nov/23/local/la-me-national-guard-employment-20121124.
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See Tim Murphy & Bill Bishop, Largest Share of Army Recruits Come from Rural/Exurban America, DAILY
YONDER,
Mar.
2,
2009,
http://www.dailyyonder.com/largest-share-army-recruits-come-ruralexurbanamerica/2009/03/02/1962.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
256
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO 02-608, Actions Needed to Better Manage Relations Between
Reservists and their Employers (2002) (stating that increased tempo and duration of deployment among reservists is
4.5 times longer than previously).
257
Alexandra Zavis, National Guard Soldiers and Airmen Face Unemployment Crisis, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2012,
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/nov/23/local/la-me-national-guard-employment-20121124.
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See Ted Daywalt, The Real Veteran Unemployment Problem, HUFFINGTON POST, Apr. 3, 2013,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ted-daywalt/veteran-unemployment_b_3003103.html
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America. 259 Non-urban Americans earn substantially less than urban workers because of lower
percentages of high-skill employment opportunities. 260
Furthermore, jobs in rural America will not grow at the same rate as in urban America. 261 One
reason is that “rural Americans are not attaining the same level of education as their urban
counterparts.” 262 Although closing the gap in high school completion, the college completion gap
between urban and rural Americans is increasing. 263 The more highly educated worker will
generally have higher earnings and a reduced chance of unemployment. 264 Not only is this a
force readiness issue, but it also presents problems if returning veterans need to file a USERRA
case. 265
Rural Americans do not have ready access to attorneys like urban Americans do. 266 Nearly “20
percent of Americans live in rural areas, but the New York Times says just 2 percent of small
law practices are in those areas.” 267 Without an attorney nearby, “rural residents may have to
drive 100 miles or more to take care of routine matters.” 268 For people of limited means, a “long
drive is a logistical hardship, requiring gas, a day away from work and sometimes an overnight
stay. And census information shows that rural communities are disproportionately poor.” 269 The
Legal Services Corporation says one legal aid attorney is available for every 6,415 low-income
Americans, which means that as many as four out of five of those people's civil legal problems
are not addressed. 270 Judge Gail Hagerty of the North Dakota Supreme Court says, "in some
cases, people just don't get the legal services they need.” 271
Pat Goetzinger, the 2011-2012 president of the State Bar of South Dakota, adds that "the strain
on local budgets as a result of not having local lawyers is astronomical.” 272 This because because
259

Brian Clauss, Protecting Civilian Employment and Providing Healthcare to Citizen Soldier in the National
Guard and Reserve Components, 45 U. MEM. L. REV. 915, 934 (2015).
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See U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., RURAL AMERICA AT A GLANCE (3d ed. 2013).
261
See U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., Employment & Education, http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/rural-economypopulation/emp loyment-education.aspx.
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Brian Clauss, Protecting Civilian Employment and Providing Healthcare to Citizen Soldier in the National
Guard and Reserve Components, 45 U. MEM. L. REV. 915, 935 (2015).
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See U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., Employment & Education, http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/rural-economypopulation/emp loyment-education.aspx.
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See Earnings and Unemployment Rates by Educational Attainment, U.S. DEP’T LABOR,
http://www.bls.gov/emp/ep_chart_001.htm (last visited Dec. 9, 2016).
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Alexandra Zavis, National Guard Soldiers and Airmen Face Unemployment Crisis, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2012,
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/nov/23/local/la-me-national-guard-employment-20121124; see also Ted Daywalt,
The Real Veteran Unemployment Problem, HUFFINGTON POST, Apr. 3, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/teddaywalt/veteran-unemployment_b_3003103.html.
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Lorelei Laird, In rural America, there are job opportunities and a need for lawyers, ABA J., (2014),
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local governments have to pay “judges, prosecutors and private defenders to drive in and handle
local cases.” 273 Goetzinger's native Bennett County was “forced to do this after its only attorney
retired, leaving the closest lawyer more than 120 miles away.” 274 In Georgia, “six of the state's
159 counties have no lawyers at all; another 40 have 10 attorneys or fewer.” 275 With limited
financial resources and scarce or non-existent attorneys, it is plain to see how violations of
USERRA can disproportionately affect rural service members. 276
iii.

The Standard of Appeal in Arbitration Under the FAA is Extremely Narrow and in
Contradiction to USERRA’s Purpose.

FAA Section 10(a) provides four limited bases for the modification of the arbitrator’s
decision. 277 Section 10(a) states:
In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the district
wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the
application of any party to the arbitration—
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or
either of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear
evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other
misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject
matter submitted was not made.
These four exceptions were described by the Seventh Circuit, in Eljer Mfg v. Kowin Dev. Corp.,
as “grudgingly narrow.” 278 In Eljer, the Seventh Circuit also held that “in addition to the reasons
set out in the statute, we will set aside an arbitrator's decision if in reaching his result, the
arbitrator deliberately disregards what he knows to be the law.” 279 This is known as a “manifest
disregard of the law.” 280 Arbitration awards cannot be overturned “merely because the arbitrators
misunderstood or misapplied the law. Typically, courts hold that the governing law must be
clearly established and that the arbitrators must be aware of the law, but nonetheless choose to

273
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Id.at 1253-54; See Health Servs. Mgmt. Corp. v. Hughes, 975 F.2d 1253, 1267 (7th Cir. 1992).
280
Goldman v. Architectural Iron Co., 306 F.3d 1214, 1216 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Dirussa v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 121 F.3d 818, 821 (2d Cir. 1997)).
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disregard it.” 281 However, courts are “quick to add that ‘manifest disregard of law’ as applied to
review of an arbitral award is a ‘severely limited’ doctrine.” 282 Furthermore, errors in the
arbitrator's interpretation of law or findings of fact do not merit reversal under this standard. 283
Nor does an insufficiency of evidence supporting the decision permit us to disturb the arbitrator's
order. 284 Arbitration does not provide a system of "junior varsity trial courts" offering the losing
party complete and rigorous de novo review. 285 It is a private system of justice offering benefits
of reduced delay and expense. 286
It is incredibly unlikely that an arbitration award will be reversed, even if the arbitrator does not
understand or apply USERRA correctly. 287 Furthermore, even if the arbitrator does not have
enough evidence to support their decision against the veteran, it cannot be overturned. 288 This
flies in the face of USERRA’s purposes. 289 We cannot expect our veterans to be subject to a
system that punishes them for serving their country. 290
V. CONCLUSION
Mr. Zoiber lost his appeal, and the Ninth Circuit held that Mr. Zoiber “failed to establish that the
legislative history evinces Congress's intent to prevent the enforcement of the arbitration
agreement he signed.” 291 In failing to uphold Mr. Zoiber’s rights under USERRA, the Ninth
Circuit joined the Eleventh Circuit in creating a dangerous precedent for service members. 292 In
Ziober, the Ninth Circuit stated, “We acknowledge the possibility that Congress did not want
"members of our armed forces to submit to binding, coercive arbitration agreements. " 293 That
intention, however, is not expressed in the statute itself, or in the legislative history. We therefore
affirm the district court's order compelling arbitration and dismissing Ziober's complaint. 294 The
concurrence in Zoiber added that it would be imprudent to create a split in the circuit by
disagreeing with the Eleventh Circuit, given how Congress can easily remedy this issue. 295 The
concurrence stated that, if “we and other circuits have misinterpreted the scope of § 4302(b),
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Congress can amend the statute to make clear that it does render pre-dispute agreements to
arbitrate USERRA claims unenforceable.” 296
Indeed, a proposed amendment 4180 to Senate Bill 2943 would do just that. 297 Proposed
Amendment 4180 is entitled “Clarifications Regarding Scope of Employment and
Reemployment Rights of Members of the Uniformed Services.” 298 It reads, in pertinent part:
(c)(1) Pursuant to this section and the procedural rights afforded by subchapter
III of this chapter, any agreement to arbitrate a claim under this chapter is
unenforceable, unless all parties consent to arbitration after a complaint on the
specific claim has been filed in court or with the Merit Systems Protection Board
and all parties knowingly and voluntarily consent to have that particular claim
subjected to arbitration.
(2) For purposes of this subsection, consent shall not be considered voluntary
when a person is required to agree to arbitrate an action, complaint, or claim
alleging a violation of this chapter as a condition of future or continued
employment, advancement in employment, or receipt of any right or benefit of
employment. 299
On December 8, 2016, this bill was passed by both the House of Representatives and
Congress. 300 On 23 December 2016, it was signed into law by President Obama. 301
USERRA is of the utmost importance in order to retain service members of the National Guard
and Reserves. 302 Without it, the country will not be able to run its military effectively. 303 By
allowing violations of USERRA to stand, the rights of our service members are being denied and
our national security is being compromised. 304
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